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TAXATION, REGULATION, AND
CONFISCATION
By RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I.

GENERAL THEORY
The recent studies on regulation have underscored an emerging truth in
the study of law and economics. The traditional modes of classification and
analysis no longer suffice to organize the study of legal institutions and legal
rules. In a former day it was quite fashionable to place public and private
law into rigid, separate compartments, each governed by its own set of rules.
Within the area of private law, it was possible to draw sharp and clear lines
between contract, tort, property and restitution. Within public law, it was
fashionable to study the various techniques of social control in isolation from
one another. Taxation could be placed in one box, regulation of wages and
prices in another, and licensure of all forms of activities in still a third. These
traditional typologies do identify the relevant techniques, but they must not
be allowed to conceal the larger structure of government action. The key
point is a simple one: all of the various means of social control, public and
private, can be applied, either alone or in combination, to any designated
set of activities. Each remedy is, or may be, a close substitute for each of
the others, such that the strength and effectiveness of the one must be evaluated in its relationship to all the others. In one sense this observation serves
as a charter of emancipation for the policy analyst, as it makes explicit the
rich array of tools available to encourage or discourage, mandate or prohibit,
various forms of social activity, all without apparent limitation. A set of
original endowments may be turned at will to maximize some defined set
of outputs in a world in which the policy maker is king.
Into this picture of uncontested hegemony I should like to inject a note
of doubt. It must be asked by what warrant, by what title, does the public
policy analyst proceed on the implicit assumption that all entitlements lie
within the public domain? At the yery least the question deserves some sort
of an answer because of the way in which the study of law and economicseven that of a conservative stripe-cuts against the ideals of limited government, individual liberty and private property, which, especially in the
American context, have deep and powerful roots of their own. At the root
of this conception is the persistent fear of abuse of power-that persons,
clothed in official garments, will convert a limited delegated authority into
an absolute source of power over others.1 This fear is so pervasive that it
0 Copyright, 1982, Richard A. Epstein.
James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author would
like to thank, in addition to the conference participants, Walter Blum, Dennis Hutchinson, Edward F. McClennen and Cass Sunstein for their insightful comments on earlier
drafts.
1
See, e.g., Madison, The Federalist (New York: Holt and Co., 1898) at 54
(No. 10).
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colours our view of social institutions. Government is viewed not as an inherent
kind of good, but as a necessary evil required to ward off the greater evils
of aggression and despoliation by self-interested individuals. The task of
constitutional theory, then, is to organize political institutions in ways to
prevent the state from becoming an organized menace greater than the individual misdeeds that it is designed to control.
To achieve this ideal of limited government, the powers of government
can be parcelled out in different layers, as in a federal system. Within each
layer of government, the principle of the separation of powers can place
the premium on caution instead of on speed. Complicated voting rules and
procedures can limit further the ability of a transient majority to impose its
will upon the population as a whole. The effective constraints upon the power
of government, however, need not be only structural and procedural. There
is still the substantive question: what ends should government serve? Here
it does seem clear, to one not nourished upon the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy, 2 that some explicit individual safeguards against government and the will of the majority should be entrenched in a bill of rights. At
the same time it seems equally clear that the individual rights so entrenched
should not be so vast and extensive as to paralyze all government action.
How then do taxation and regulation fit into this sceptical view of government powers? Here we can start with the received wisdom that each is a
close substitute for the other, and note that the differences between them
all go to matters of detail and technique, rather than to basic principle. Now
push that equivalence one step further. Regulation and taxation both may
be used as instruments of confiscation, because both are the equivalent of the
(partial) taking of private property. To understand this, it is necessary only
to accept two propositions. The first is that the loss of any right in property
is like a loss of property itself. To deny that proposition is to say that the
state can take sticks in the bundle of rights one by one without compensation,
when compensation would be required if the taking of the entire bundle were
compressed into a single step.3 Here the central point remains obvious. It is
insufficient to control the obvious abuses of outright confiscation if its close
substitutes are left unregulated and uncontrolled. There is no sense to a
system which allows the government, under the guise of regulation, to take
interests in real estate-for example covenants or easements-worth ninety
percent of the land itself without paying a dime, when the government is
required to pay full value for the land, if taken outright. In effect, the distinction between complete and partial losses sets up a sharp discontinuity in the
costs to government of the different modes of acquiring interests in real
property. Under the banner of regulation it can acquire, without cost to itself,
a limited interest in property worth ninety percent of the fee. In the alterna2 See generally, Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
(10th ed., reprint 1959, London: MacMillan and Co., 1965) at 39-86.
3 A taking by government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain must be
accompanied by just compensation: U.S. Const. amend. V. See inIra note 9 and accompanying text.
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tive it can acquire the full fee for its market value. As it sees matters, therefore, the full cost of the property is embedded in the acquisition of its last
tenth. It is no wonder then that the government will not purchase the fee
when it can take the limited interest.
The second proposition is that the taking from many individuals at the
same time does not insulate the state from the charge of a taking any more
than it does a private individual. Thus murder is a wrong and so too is
genocide. The thief is not purged because he has taken from all the members
of a group instead of only one, and the unfortunate private defendant who
runs down a busload of children cannot escape his liability because he has
damaged many persons instead of one. The progression from the single to
the many on the question of what constitutes a taking of property-in whole
or in part-is itself a matter of simple summation. There is no subtle interaction of the parts which allow takings from many to be viewed as something
else solely because they are directed to a large number of individuals at any
given point in time. Efforts have been made to avoid that conclusion, and
thereby to restrict the reach of the eminent domain clause in American constitutional litigation. It has been said for example that the power of eminent
domain is one thing, and the power of taxation is quite another; 4 and so too
the police power has been said to be one thing, the eminent domain power
quite another. 5 These rigid schemes of classification are designed to blunt
the compensation requirement of the eminent domain principle and historically, with taxation and regulation, they have largely succeeded to that end.
On intellectual grounds, however, the strategy simply will not work. An
eminent domain provision in any scheme of constitutional government is not
a grant of additional power to government. Instead it places a limitation upon
the powers of government that are already in place, including both general
powers of taxation and regulation. In both cases, that limitation upon government will be idle if by persuasive redefinition the state can defeat the obligation to compensate that it otherwise should incur. Taxes and regulation are
forms of taking, to be examined under principles applicable to all other
takings.
To say this much, however, is not to insist upon a strict equivalence
between taxation, regulation and confiscation., Indeed, to equate taxation and
regulation with theft is to condemn all government at the outset, as there
is none that could function without resort to these powers. How can we avoid
this extreme result, steer a middle course, and identify those forms of taxation and regulation that should survive, and those that should be condemned?
4 See, e.g.,

Brashaberv. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 493, 36 S.Ct.

236 (1915).
5

.Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L.Ed. 205, 8 S.Ct. 273 (1887).

6The term confiscation is not used in the sense that is appropriate when, for example, government officials confiscate stolen property or smuggled goods. Those cases
are best understood as instances in which the taking, although called confiscation, is
justified by the police power given the prior wrong of the individual against whom
the power is directed. That form of justification is, however, far removed from the
concerns here.
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To approach this question it is best to consider the simplest form of the
taking of property, say the taking of land for use as a post office, and ask
what differentiates it from the illicit confiscation of that same land. That some
difference exists seems clear enough; we all understand that killing and
murder, although related, are very different affairs. While killing may be
justified, for example, in self-defense, calling a particular killing murder
means that the possibility of justification in the particular case has been
excluded. So too with the analogous relationship between the taking of
property and the theft of property; the first admits the possibility of justification that the second precludes. With this much said, the relationship between
taking and confiscation can be captured by the following proposition: the
taking of private property is prima facie confiscation. 7 So too its close substitutes, the partial takings by way of regulation and taxation. But to treat the
taking as only a prima facie wrong is to admit the possibility of justification.
With government it seems proper to recognize two separate justifications, one of which it shares with the private individual who wishes to acquit
himself of the charge of theft, and one of which is unique to its special status
as the monopolist of force within the jurisdiction. The first of these generally
goes in public law discussions under the name of the police power and can
be defined quite simply as the power of the state to prevent the commission
of wrongs-for example the taking of property, the use of force or fraud-by
one individual against another. 8 The principles that govern taxes and regulations directed towards this end are difficult enough in their own right, and I
will not dwell upon them here, except to note that there is no principled way
that the exception, so useful in nuisance control matters, can account for the
comprehensive revenue measures and the major forms of social regulationprice controls and the like-in issue here. The crux of the matter therefore
lies in the second justification: that of making compensation, explicit or implicit, for a taking for a public purpose brought about against the will of the
owner.
In most cases the easiest way to tender compensation is with money,
but there is no strict requirement for its use, even if it is invariably used with,
say, the taking of an isolated parcel of land. More importantly for these
purposes, this cash remedy will not work in every case. Taxes and regulation
are partial takings, either from all individuals or a very large group of them.
There is at this point a circular and self-defeating quality about any insistence
upon explicit compensation. The money raised in taxes must now be returned
to the very individuals from whom it was collected. A regulation would require the imposition of additional taxes to compensate the regulated parties
for their losses, which in turn makes the taxes levied themselves uncompensated takings. Therefore, with co-ordinated takings from a large number of
individuals, explicit compensation can no longer be the norm, but the rare
7 On the use of presumptions, see Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions (1973), 40
U. Chi. L. Rev. 556.
8 The classic discussion is contained in Freund, The Police Power (Chicago:
Callaghan & Co., 1904).
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exception. What must be reckoned as the compensation for the property
taken are the benefits received from the government operations, be it in the
provision of roads, of police protection, or in the administration of justice,
or whatever.
In a well-ordered state there is some reason to believe that the benefits
derived from taxation and regulation will exceed the correlative costs. But it
is one thing to make the assertion and quite another to demonstrate its truth.
The nub of the difficulty is that any shift from explicit to implicit compensation makes it quite difficult to calculate the size of the benefits received, even
if (itself a somewhat doubtful assumption) the costs in question can themselves be calculated precisely. The question is whether these difficulties make
it necessary to retreat to one of two extremes, both of which seem quite
untenable. Either no taxation or regulation is allowed, or all taxation and
regulation is allowed. Either government ends, or the constraints imposed
upon it lie in the political process, where the unfairness found in regulation
or taxation is to be beaten back or endured. Follow the line and the policy
analyst has his domain at last, at least that portion of it-comprehensive
control-that he covets most.
In general, this second alternative has been embraced, even in the United
States with its strong constitutional tradition and its explicit eminent domain
provision. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 9 While it is possible to find grudging concessions by American judges that certain forms of regulation and taxation can go "too far", 10
the more basic truth is that the supposed limits are never reached no matter
what the form of government exaction."
The only way to blunt this massive rejection of limited government on
economic matters is to find some intermediate position that:
(a) allows limited supervision of the powers to tax and regulate,
(b) escapes the burdens of direct measurement, and
(c) blunts the greatest abuses of government.
Here the central insight is contained in a principle of American eminent

9 U.S. Const. amend. V. Note that the same argument can to some extent be made
in the American context from the language of the taxing power, in U.S. Const. art. I,
s. 8,cl. 1:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.
The references to "common", "general", and "uniform" all hint at the disproportionate impact test which itself has been incorporated into the eminent domain clause.
1OPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 at 415, 43 S.Ct. 158 at 160
(1922).
11See, e.g., A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 78 L.Ed. 1109, 54 S.Ct.
599 (1934); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 65 L.Ed.
489,41 S.Ct. 219 (1921).
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domain law, 12 whereby the disproportionate impact of a tax or regulation
functions as an indirect measure of the adequacy of compensation. Although
used in some contexts, this test to date has not been applied seriously to
taxation and regulation, largely because of the occupational hazard of lawyers which prevents them from taking a comprehensive approach to the
various forms of social control.
The extension of the disproportionate impact principle to taxation and
regulation would not be sufficient in and of itself to strike down all unfortunate forms of regulation and taxation. But the rule, even if underinclusive,
does provide strong incentives to control the behaviour of the state. Within
rough practical limits, the prohibition against disproportionate impact is
designed to insure that no one will be able to obtain benefits that exceed costs
without extending these same benefits to all other individuals who are also
subject to the regulation. The rule therefore helps prevent the creation of a
situation in which the proponents of a tax or regulation enjoy benefits in
excess of costs while others are made to bear costs in excess of benefits. To
be sure, the rule does nothing to prevent a situation in which a general tax
or regulation leaves everyone in the system-be they proponents or opponents of the new regime-worse off than they were under the old: if everyone were left worse off, then the impact, while undesirable, would not be
disproportionate. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the unfortunate state of
affairs created by such a law would be stable over time, in as much as it
leaves all persons net losers. If all (or nearly all) persons are left worse off
under the regulation or the tax, then no one would have any incentive to
work for its adoption or preservation. The principle therefore exerts powerful
incentives to ensure adoption of only those measures that advance collective
welfare, however defined. On the other hand, it prevents the paralysis that
follows from adherence to a unanimity requirement for social change, as the
state power to force exchanges means that the "hold-out" person may be
bought out, not for his asking price, but for some price which leaves him
at least as well off as he was under the previous legal regime.
To state the general thesis in this fashion is, however, not to answer all
the objections that can be raised against it. The initial set of difficulties comes
at two levels. The first concerns the potential reach of the disproportionate
impact test. The second concerns its consequences: when it applies, will the

12 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 at 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563 at 1569
(1960): "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole." See also, Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
at 602, 55 S.Ct. 854 at 869 (1935), for a similar expression of the basic sentiment.
In one sense the Radford case is the more relevant one here, for in it the Supreme Court
struck down on eminent domain grounds legislation that destroyed the existing liens
of a very broad class of creditors against a very broad class of debtors. The special
legislation involved in that case was akin to a tax because it possessed a degree of
generality that was not found in Armstrong, supra, where what was in issue was a
subcontractor lien on several uncompleted boats.
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test impose any real restriction upon the power of government to take from
some and to give to others?
First, deciding whether a given tax or regulation is disproportionate will
not normally be a simple affair. It is, for example, very difficult to determine
in the abstract whether a head tax or a proportionate income tax is required,
or whether a progressive income tax-whose possibilities for abuse are manifest-is permitted. 13 Indeed the possible scope of the principle goes further,
to reach all the protean forms of taxation that have been used by government
from time immemorial to raise the revenues of the state. Special taxes upon
certain commodities-for example, liquor-have long been a staple in the
government arsenal. Distinctions between various forms of property-for
instance, differential tax rates for commercial and residential real propertyhave become a standard feature of municipal taxation. Special rules for certain industries, such as insurance, or certain forms of voluntary associations,
partnerships, corporations, or trusts, have always been adopted.
Yet while the attack on current practices may be extensive, this alone
does not furnish any reason in principle to shrink from the general consequences of this position. At most, invalidation mandates a general simplification and unification of taxation and regulation. It does not, however, limit
the level of government expenditures or taxation, or even require anything
like a balanced budget. To be sure, it goes against long-standing practices in
a great number of instances, but this itself only means that it is an instrument
that limits the long-standing abuses of government power. Unlike most efforts
at aggressive constitutional action, for example, busing, the eminent domain
principle operates only as a constraint against legislative or administrative
action, and not as its spur.
It may be said as well that the constraints, even if imposed, will be of
no real consequence. But a single constraint upon the operation of government power, if the right one, can bite hard. To deny its force in the context
is somewhat like saying that the principle of "one man, one vote" should
be rejected because it still leaves government officials a certain amount of
freedom to gerrymander voting districts. But although some degree of freedom is left, the area in which it operates is sharply circumscribed. In the
analysis that follows, three recent special taxes are considered: those against
mining companies for the benefit of black lung disease victims, the windfall
profits tax, and the Montana coal severance tax. The sums of money involved
in each case are so substantial, and their incidence so skewed, that it is
quite unlikely that any government could pass neutral legislation governing
income that had anything like the distributional consequences of these taxes.
There would be no way in which to target the tax against the same persons, and the revenues so derived from indirect measures would be difficult to calculate and would in any event fall into the general pool where they
could not be earmarked for any specific purpose or group. And if various
13 See, e.g., Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1952),
19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417.
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government officials tried to strike up a deal to reintroduce the prohibited
scheme "by the back door", ample documentary and testimonial evidence
would help pierce the new artifice; all abuses would not be eliminated, but
many could be curtailed. The old ways of doing business could not last in
the new constitutional order. In an ideal constitutional system more explicit
constraints upon powers to tax and regulate might be appropriate, however
difficult to formulate. But as a general matter, even the limited protection
provided by the eminent domain clause is preferable to no protection at all.
Administrative matters to one side, a further challenge might be made:
why is it that disproportionate impacts are regarded as improper in taxation
and regulation when they are tolerated in the original acquisition, as by first
possession, 14 and in subsequent voluntary transfers of rights? Here the answer
lies in the very different function of the two types of rules. The original rules
of acquisition operate in an environment in which no person has vested rights
in external things. Likewise a voluntary transfer of admitted rights is not a
violation of the rights of others; for A to sell his house to B is not to commit
a tort against a stranger, C. Under these circumstances there is simply no
occasion to address the question of whether certain private acts have disproportionate impacts, for the issue of compensation to others, to which the
disproportionate impact test applies, simply does not arise. Only after a widespread taking of private property-a wrong by the state-has been established
does that question become relevant as an indirect measure of the levels of
compensation that are required by the eminent domain principle.
But to all this it could be said that it is improper to look at the matter
from such a narrow and incremental view, as the chief normative objection
to the eminent domain principle itself is that the current distribution of entitlements has been obtained by improper and illicit means. What is needed,
the argument continues, is not the protection of the rights now asserted, but
a return of property to the persons with superior title to it. That such may be
a legitimate attack on certain holdings of wealth cannot in principle be denied. The original entitlements of the various Indian tribes is one case in
which the argument might well have powerful bite. Yet what is interesting
about most schemes of taxation and regulation is that they are not justified
by challenges to the legitimacy of the current holdings of the parties so taxed
or regulated. No one in support of price controls, minimum wage laws, or
various forms of special taxation is prepared to assert, let alone establish,
that the original parties improperly acquired such holdings. Indeed if their
acquisition had been tainted, these property possessors, not being owners,
would not have been simply regulated or taxed. Instead their property would
have been taken away by main force without regard to the residual interest
left to the aggrieved party. In short, prior wrongful acts of any given party
will justify state responses commensurate with the wrongs in question. But
this will not justify any massive system of taxation or regulation that does
not allege, let alone establish, such wrongful conduct.
14 See, for my views on this subject, Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title
(1979), 13 Georgia L. Rev. 1221.
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The last objection to the disproportionate impact test is in reality an
objection to the larger requirement of compensation when the government
takes private property. Quite simply, the point is that wealth redistribution
is a proper function of the state, one that is precluded by a systematic adherence to the eminent domain principle. In one large class of cases the point
can, I think, be easily turned aside. It is very difficult to think of an intelligible moral principle which tolerates wealth transfers from some well-to-do
individuals to other persons of the same class, or, as is often the case through
taxation and regulation, from the poor to the rich. In preventing, therefore,
the voters in a local municipality from imposing extensive land use restrictions upon the isolated owners of undeveloped lands, the eminent domain
principle works at its best by blocking (de facto, through the insistence upon
payment of compensation) a set of measures that causes a capricious transfer
of wealth from some individuals to others, and dissipates overall wealth by
inducing expenditures of resources either to secure or to resist the passage
of the regulation in question.
This first reply is, however, not decisive across the board because it does
not address the efforts to redistribute wealth from rich to poor as part of a
comprehensive welfare scheme. In truth, the case for such redistribution by
compulsory means is far from clear, as it must be explained why poor individuals are entitled to obtain through the intervention of the state those
benefits which they could not individually claim directly from the rich themselves: need alone never generates an entitlement, because it never shows
which person should pay, or why. The institution of welfare may be defended
on the ground that its universal acceptance points to an overwhelming social
consensus in its favour, a consensus that serves as a close enough substitute
to the ideal of individualized and unanimous consent demanded by a rigourous theory of individual rights. Yet this rationale itself suggests that redistribution is principled only if it satisfies at least one stringent condition. It will
simply not do for the poor-by votes-to place unlimited exactions upon the
rich. If it is the consent of the donors that matters in principle, then the
preferences of the donees, even if registered in votes, can hardly be decisive,
whether on the amounts of the coerced transfers or the conditions on which
they should be made. Nor are matters made better if some rich join in the
demands of the poor, especially if they contrive the passage of special taxes
or regulations that fall exclusively on others in the population opposed to
the general redistributive scheme. The principled limitation upon the power
of the state has, however, been met and exceeded by a whole host of recent
special taxes and regulations, whose disproportionate impacts are evident
from the face of the legislation itself. In this paper I shall discuss four such
systems of special legislation: black lung disease compensation programmes,
the windfall profits tax on crude oil, special state severance taxes upon coal
and the Canadian regulation of foreign investment. The first two programmes
in large measure deal with redistributions from rich to poor, while the second
two do not. Yet even if allowances are made in the first two cases for redistributive goals, all four schemes should be condemned in any system that
respects both private property and the need for limited government.
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H.
A.

APPLICATIONS
Black Lung Compensation Programme
The black lung disease compensation programme was enacted by the
United States during the early 1970s in order to establish a special fund for
the compensation of those coal mine workers disabled by black lung disease.15
The funds for the programme originally came in part from general revenues
-and in part from special charges imposed upon mines in order to make disability payments to former employees in the individual mines. To the firms
so burdened, the payments in question were like a special tax on established
mines. The competitive differential between old and new mines became so
great, however, that Congress thereafter modified the programme to require
all mining companies to contribute to the fund on the same basis, including
newly established mines that had never employed any workers benefiting
from the plan. In imposing the particular tax, it was conceded that there
was no unsatisfied legal obligation running from the mines (old or new) to
the covered workers, as all claims in tort or under workers' compensation
law were properly barred, if ever valid. While there was some causal nexus
(at least in the case of the old mines) between the injury to the workers
and the mines, the nexus was wholly insufficient (and recognized as such)
to support any form of legal responsibility whatsoever.
In dealing with the black lung disease compensation programme, the
United States Supreme Court in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.16 sustained the tax on grounds that fulfilled the dreams of the policy analyst intent
upon securing his widest domain. In effect, it recognized that the tax was
unfair; that being retroactive it could have no incentive effects, desirable or
otherwise; and that the current exposures to dangerous substances were extensively controlled by other regulatory systems. It stopped short of calling
the tax a taking from one class of individuals followed by a gift to another,
although that is what it was.
Let it be agreed that some redistribution by the state is permitted; it still
does not follow that there should be no constraints upon the appropriate
patterns of redistribution. As noted above, the ability to generate special
benefits without any constitutional limitations-one half the policy analyst's
dream-should only spur demand for effective limitations upon the collection
of the wealth to be redistributed. No narrow segment of the rich should be
singled out for special burdens, even if some narrow segment of the poor is
selected for special benefits. There will be some greater effort for legislative
responsibility if the funds in question must be drawn out of general revenues
than if they can be taken from one narrow group of the population, whose
members receive none of the moneys so collected. It is better by far that as
many as possible of those in favour of the redistribution be made to pay their
pro ratashare, for one is apt to be somewhat less generous when the coercion
15 Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.

91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969), as am. by the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §901
et seq. (1979 & Cum. Sup. May 1982).
16 428 U.S. 1, 49 L.Ed. 2d 752, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (1976).
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of another comes at the price of payment by one's self. Therefore, to permit
complete freedom as to both the objects of taxation and the beneficiaries of
the tax is to allow a comprehensive scheme of confiscation which should not
escape either constitutional condemnation (in the American system) or moral
condemnation (everywhere). The grander the scheme of redistribution, the
gfeater the need for its social control.
B.

Windfall Profits Tax
The principles used to analyze the black lung disease compensation programme can be carried over in straightforward fashion to the analysis of the
American windfall profits tax upon crude oil.1 7 The tax itself, when reduced
to its essentials, is imposed upon the difference between the fair market value
of the crude oil, and the price for which it could be sold under the previous
scheme of direct controls. As regulated prices for all forms of oil were originally set quite low in the name of consumer protection, the differential
between the market value and the regulated price became quite substantial
after the major rise in world energy prices during the 1970s. As the tax
ranges from sixty to seventy-five percent, it is evident that billions in revenue
are at stake.
Standing alone, the windfall profits tax places a disproportionate burden
upon one class of property-to wit, crude oil. The forbidden redistributive
aspects of the tax are even more evident when two additional points are
noted. First, large portions of the tax are designed to go into general trust
funds, with an eye toward the improvement of transportation, the condition
of the aged, and the like. There is thus no possibility of arguing that the tax
is imposed in order to offset some special benefit to the oil industry. Second,
the supporters of the tax note with great pride that the owners of crude oil
cannot pass the tax forward to consumers.' s
Under existing American case law there is no effective way to challenge
the tax. But taking the case on its merits, the disproportionate burdens condemn the tax. To this charge it might be answered, the legislative intention
notwithstanding, that the tax is passed forward and thus falls generally upon
the public at large, that benefits and burdens do match after all. Here it would
be pointless for any court to attempt to assess the precise ways in which this

"7Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
18 "The committee believes that this tax will reduce profits of oil producers and
royalty owners, rather than be passed on to consumers as higher prices." S. Rep. No.
96-394, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 414.
The reasoning behind this position is that, as the tax is only upon profits, the seller
will maximize his return by selling at the same price at which he would without the
imposition of the "windfall tax". The argument is weak insofar as it does not take into
account the important, if obvious, point that the tax in question will reduce the amount
of oil which will be produced from the wells it covers, which will in turn raise the
market price because of the reduction in the overall supply. Yet this effect, whose magnitude I cannot begin to estimate, is not important for our discussion. What is important
is that there is strong evidence of motive which shows what is apparent on the face;
that there is no effort to match in even the vaguest way the benefits and burdens of this
tax.
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particular tax works itself into the fabric of the economy. The real question
therefore is what attitude it should take if it is serious, as it should be, about
making sure that taxation is not a disguised form of confiscation-even on
the generous view that allows some redistribution to the poor not financed
by special taxes. In my view, the risk of error should fall squarely upon the
government because it has adopted the means which make it so difficult
to trace out the consequences of the taxes that it wishes to impose.' 0 How
can the government object if it is required to impose the very general revenue
tax-here a broadly based income tax-which it claims, in effect, to havb
imitated?
There is no question that the ordinary conception of ownership includes
the rights to possess, use and dispose of the thing in question. 20 Should the
state demand that some oil not be sold at all, it will have taken from the original
owner an incident of ownership which is valued at the difference between
the value of the oil in exchange and its highest value in use to that particular
owner. Where the government allows the oil to be sold, but at a regulated
price below fair market value, the principle does not change, even if that
which has been taken 2' from producers is given to consumers, or, for that
matter, wholly dissipated. The incident of disposition is not wholly removed,
but compensation for that part of the incident which is taken must be made
nonetheless. To this it might be suggested that it is odd in the extreme to
speak of the taking by the government "of a part of a part", especially when
the government as such does not keep the part so taken. But there is confiscation if the government says to a landowner that it will take a half of a half
of his land, just as when it says it will take a quarter thereof. And it would
make no difference if it gave the land to some group of worthy individuals
instead of keeping it for itself, or ruined it for cultivation. Why then should
there be any difference when we speak of the right implicit in ownership to
sell the oil in question? Here the market price is the only proper benchmark
against which regulation or taxation should be measured because it is the
only price which respects the unfettered right to dispose (to those who wish
to purchase) that counts as part of the original bundle of ownership rights.
The regulation is the wrong benchmark against which to measure the entitlements of the individual owner against the state. To be sure, the invalidation
of the tax would lead to a contraction of all government programmes and
services, including those with redistributive ends. But this counts as a strength
19 There is a parallel argument in the tort literature from the law of negligence.
Thus, where a defendant is negligent, and his negligence has destroyed some evidence
that is necessary to establish the linkage between his negligence and the plaintiff's harm,
the court will shift the burden of proof to the defendant on the question that his own
wrong has made more difficult to answer. The leading American case on the issue is
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P. 2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).

The analogous case for Canadian law is McGhee v. National Coal Bd., [1972] 3 All E.R.
1008 (H.L.).
20 See, e.g., Honore, "Ownership" in Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence
(Glasgow: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961) 107.
21 That is, the amount obtained by applying the windfall tax rate to the amount by
which fair market value exceeds the regulated price.

19821

Taxation, Regulation and Confiscation

and not a weakness of the position, as it only denies certain groups in society
the luxury of directing government force against those unable to defend
themselves in the political process.
C.

State Severance Taxes

The third of the special taxes is the state severance tax of up to thirty
percent "of the contract sales price" imposed by the state of Montana upon
coal removed from the ground. 22 The tax was sustained by the United States
Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.23 The tax in question was levied upon all coal so removed, whether from federal or from state
lands, and whether intended after sale for local use or for use in other states.
The tax worked out to be about a seven-fold increase over the previous
severance taxes-taxes based on tonnage and not on value-imposed by the
state. The increased levels were explicitly justified by the Montana state
legislature on the ground that the state held within its borders a portion of
the low sulfur coal large enough so that demand for its coal would not dry
up once the tax was imposed.2 4 In a manner reminiscent of the windfall
profits tax, at least one-half of the monies collected were placed into a special
trust fund,25 the principal of which could be spent only with the approval
of three-fourths of the members of each house.26 The revenues generated
by the tax were sufficient to permit Montana to reduce, as it in fact did, both
its personal income and property taxes.
In the Supreme Court case, the challenge relevant here was that the
27
tax offended the so-called negative implications of the commerce clause
because it constituted a barrier to free trade between the states.28 In determining what these negative implications of the commerce clause are, the Court
has made it very clear that the extreme position-no tax at all on goods in
interstate commerce-cannot be sustained. Instead, operating under the credo
that "'[e]ven interstate business must pay its way,' "29 the Court fashioned
rules which in some rough sense at least guarantee that goods in interstate
commerce are not subject to any special burden from which local competitive
goods are exempt. 30 The economic rationale behind this general position is
Mont. Code Ann. § 15-35-101 et seq. (1981).
453 U.S. 609, 101 S.Ct. 2946 (1981).
24
Supra note 22, § 15-35-101(e).
25Id., § 15-35-108(1).
20Id., § 17-6-203(5).
27
"The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several
22

States...." U.S. Const. art. I, s. 8, ci. 3.

28
The United States Supreme Court has been prepared to look at discriminatory
regulations under the negative commerce clause. Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby
County, 120 U.S. 489, 30 L.Ed. 694, 7 S.Ct. 592 (1887).
29 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 at 254, 58 S.Ct. 546 at
548 (1933).
SOSee, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 44 L.Ed.2d 1, 95 S.Ct.
1538 (1974); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S.
707, 31 L.Ed. 2d 620, 92 S.Ct. 1349 (1972).
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clear enough, for the rule prevents the substitution from superior to inferior
goods that would take place as a matter of course if taxes were imposed
solely upon out-of-state goods. The general formulation of the rule was expounded in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,31 where it was held that
a state tax does not offend the commerce clause if it "is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
'32
provided by the State.
In this formulation, the first two elements are essentially irrelevant to
our inquiry because they are always satisfied: everything turns on the last
two. The fourth prong of the test restates in fairly clear form the general
benefit test of taxation, which requires some commensurate benefit to the
parties taxed. The third element, moreover, can be read in harmony with
the fourth, if the element of "discrimination" in treatment is regarded as a
rephrasing of the disproportionate impact test--our indirect measure of
benefits provided for an admitted taking.
With this much said, the severance tax in question can be viewed from
two vantage points. The first goes to federalism. It may be quite impermissible to have a court pass upon the tax under a negative commerce clause
analysis. It is undisputed that Congress has full and plenary power to regulate
the shipment of coal in interstate commerce, and, to achieve that end, to
regulate the coal which remains in intrastate commerce as well. If there is
some nation-wide outrage against the tax, the matter can be resolved in Congress, sparing the courts the heavy burden of intervention.3 3 The basic position can then be reinforced by a second observation that once a court gets
into the business of striking down particular taxes it will never be able to
extricate itself from the perils of standardless litigation.3 4 The reply to the
first point is that the stakes are so high that coalitions amongst special interest
groups will block sensible legislative action, so that judicial intervention to
create the free trade zone is welcome as a matter of principle, here as in the
many other cases where the negative powers have been invoked. The reply
to the second is that underinclusive tests that permit the invalidation of some
taxes should not be spumed if they admit of workable application solely
because they cannot reach every abuse which state legislatures can contrive.
A detailed analysis of the economic impacts of the taxes involved here is not
necessary to condemn them on this ground. The obvious motive of the legislature in singling out a single commodity for differential taxation without so
much as a colourable justification calls for at least some intervention.
This federalism question need not further detain us, as the tax may be
3' 430 U.S. 274, 51 L.Ed. 2d 326, 97 S.Ct. 1076 (1977).
32 Id. at 279 (U.S.), 1079 (S.Ct.).
33 See Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalism: The Role of the Supreme Court
in Preserving a National Common Market for Energy Supplies (1982), 53 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 281.
34 For a forceful statement of this view, see Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations
on State Tax Exportation, [1982] A.B.F. Res. J. I at 55.
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challenged from the second vantage point of individual rights: have any individuals, either the original owners of the coal or the purchasers thereof, been
subjected to an uncompensated taking of their coal? On this matter, the general
power of the Congress over commerce is of no importance. Instead, two
questions of individual rights arise. The first asks whether individuals who are
outside the taxing jurisdiction are required to pay special taxes for which
they receive no comparable benefits. The second asks with equal force
whether individuals within the taxing jurisdiction, who have some rights of
participation in the local political process, are nonetheless victimized by its
outcome.
As regards both producers and buyers, the ultimate issue of this eminent
domain analysis is: was the tax fairly related to the services provided by the
state? Looking at the matter in the abstract, it is clear that something must
be amiss. If the original severance tax was proper, then it is doubtful that its
replacement-seven times its size, and wholly different in its mode of collection-could well match the constant set of benefits provided by the state. It
could of course be argued that the original tax furnished some sort of subsidy
for the producers and consumers of coal in that the original rates were set
too low. But as there is no indication of what serv;' s, apart from general
police protection, were provided by the state, this possibility should be
accepted only upon very strong evidence-evidence not to be found in the
record of the case.
The Court in Commonwealth Edison did not, however, make the slightest pretence of identifying or valuing the services rendered by the state.
Instead, the opinion at its critical point 35 abandons the benefit test by quoting
an extensive passage from Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,a6 the
gist of which is that "[t]he only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in
an organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes
to public purposes." But this simply will not do. By adopting some version
of the benefit test, it must be understood that a given tax--or regulation-can
in principle flunk the test so announced. Yet here there is no question but
that every person will receive some scrap of benefit from every tax, however
imposed, no matter how outlandish its rates, no matter how bizarre its purposes. Any inquiry into the operation and effect of a tax is barred in effect
as long as society continues to function. The level of the benefit received for
property taken should be treated as a question of fact, on which it is wholly
improper to erect a conclusive presumption of adequacy. Yet after the value
of benefits received is made relevant, then this tax must fail. Unless there is
some special benefit of the severance tax to the owners or purchasers of the
coal beyond the provision of the usual police protection and the like, already
paid for by other taxes, then the tax must be struck down.
To satisfy the benefit test, it might be urged that the increase in the
35 Supra note 23 at 628 (U.S.), 2960
36

(S.Ct.).

301 U.S. 495 at 522, 57 S.Ct. 868 at 878-79 (1937).
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value of the mined coal increases the value of the state services rendered to
the aggrieved parties. So much can be conceded, but it will not save this severance tax under the sensible tests announced for passing on its validity. If
it turns out that coal properties are far more valuable because of the increased demands for energy than they were before, there are at least two
ways that the state can capture its fair portion of that increase in value without resorting to the special severance tax. It can tax the increased amount
of the gain on sale as part of the general income tax; as the gain increases
so will the tax dollars collected. Or it can in more powerful fashion capture
the gain as part of the general sales tax-roughly comparable for all commodities-or as part of a real estate tax based upon overall valuation, which
is not, it must be added, restricted to those minerals which are severed from
the ground, but which reaches all those which are in place. With these principled alternatives available, there is no reason to sanction the imposition
of a tax, be it on producers or consumers, which is wholly abusive.
Commonwealth Edison, then, is an easy case given any rough estimate
as to the match between the benefits and the burdens of the tax. Nor are
matters better if disproportionate impact is the only ground upon which the
tax could be struck down. Here again it is necessary to distinguish the position of the producers from that of the out-of-state consumers. With regard
to the former, it seems clear that the portion of the tax which producers
cannot pass forward is a disproportionate and therefore prohibited burden.
In essence, the argument is that the national market in coal is highly competitive so that, where existing contracts themselves do not call for an automatic pass through of the tax increase, the producers will have to absorb
most, if not all of the tax, in order not to lose sales to producers elsewhere. 37
The argument for consumers is a bit more complex. Here on first
appearance it might seem that there was no illicit discrimination because the
tax was, as the Supreme Court noted, the same on local consumers as on
out-of-state ones. But this wholly ignores two points. First, where the taxes
are passed through under prior contracts, there is the strong likelihood of
disproportionate burden unless it can be also shown that coal sold in domestic markets is subject to the same type of contractual provision. The second
point applies to all these contractual arrangements. Of critical importance
here is the parallel reductions in income and property taxes for local residents only. These reductions were made possible not by a reduction in internal state spending, but by the increase in the revenues derived from the
severance tax upon coal. To be sure, the severance tax was imposed upon
coal used for internal consumption as well. But the key point is that the two
taxes were part of an integrated plan. So viewed it is clear that the decrease
in the local income and property taxes functioned as a rough equivalent of a
rebate to the severance tax. Here there will be no perfect correlation in the
reduction of property and income taxes and the increase in severance taxes,
but the match is close enough, especially since it is only local citizens who
have a chance, not to say a near certainty, of participating in the windfall.
37 See Hellerstein, supra note 34 at 30; Williams, supra note 33 at 291.
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If the tax reforms are taken as a package, as they were no doubt viewed in
the legislature, the severance tax must be condemned not because it is discriminatory in itself, but because it was part of a comprehensive plan whose
impact was disproportionate. On this view, therefore, the question of how
much of the tax is passed forward and how much is not is quite immaterial.
No matter which view of the transaction is taken, some group of individuals-it matters not whether they are local producers or out-of-state consumers-is subject to illicit burdens.
What then are the permissible powers of taxation? Here I do not suggest
that some excise tax could not be imposed upon coal. As a first approximation, it is clear that the state is in fine shape if the tax it imposes is no greater
than the sales tax which it imposes upon other commodities. As a further
refinement, additional taxes could well be justified by showing that there are
certain greater burdens imposed upon the state by the removal of coal from
the ground-although none are even suggested in Commonwealth Edison.
What is prevented is a justification for tax that quite simply asserts-as did
Montana-that the state may tax its coal because it wants the revenue very
much. To make that argument is to insist not upon sovereign control held
over all property by the state but the private ownership of this coal by the
state. It is therefore to confiscate by assertion alone. The moral for Canada
should be obvious. The division of proceeds over the sale of Canadian oil
should not be regarded solely as a political power struggle between the provincial and federal governments. Where the oil in question is in private hands
(as is the case with roughly twenty percent of the Albertan oil) neither the
provincial nor the federal government should be allowed to subject it to
special discriminatory taxes. Where the ownership is vested in the province
of Alberta,s the federal government should not engage in partial acts of
confiscation by subjecting that oil to special federal charges. Unless it can
find some way to undermine the original distribution of rights, its claim to
the oil rests upon greater might, not superior right.
Canadaand the United States: Price Controls and Foreign Investment
The general principles used to distinguish the permissible from impermissible forms of taxation and regulation have thus far been illustrated exclusively with materials drawn from the American experience. The principles
themselves, however, are subject to no particular territorial limitation. Even
though the constitutional framework of Canada is quite different from that
of the United States, the normative portions of the arguments survive even
if the textual portions of the argument do not. Indeed, the normative element of the discussion is, if anything, somewhat more important in a system
without entrenched individual rights: when everything is left within the political domain, legislative self-restraint has a greater importance than it does
in a constitutional democracy.
With this said, it seems clear that in Canada, as in the United States,
D.

38 Alberta has retained ownership and extraction rights in petroleum and natural
gas in most public land devised to private owners. See the Public Lands Act, R.S.A.
1980, c. 297, s. 34.
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the ideal of self-restraint has not been able to survive the massive shock
to the political and economic systems resulting from the energy crisis. At
one level, the arguments are on grounds of economic policy that are not tied
to the system of individual rights referred to above. As a matter of policy,
the best thing that any government can do in response to sudden and unanticipated shifts in the prices of vital goods brought on, say, by a cartel, is
nothing-nothing at all. Inaction by the government will make it clear that
private responses to the external changes are required, and these in turn can
be made with greater accuracy in light of the reduced political uncertainty.
On the demand side, major individual efforts can find substitute ways of
doing business that blunt the effect of the price rise. On the supply side,
alternative forms of energy, previously uneconomical, become viable financial
propositions under the price umbrella created by the cartel. Some might think
that this prescription is too dramatic, for an alternative, imposing tariffs on
the importation of foreign oil, might capture domestically some of the cartel
rents. But the tariff levels must be precisely set, and there is always the risk
that domestic producers, with expenditures of real resources, will be able to
keep them in place even after the cartel ceases to function. The temptation
to fine tune the response to external shifts in market conditions should therefore be resisted; cartels should be left to fall of their own weight. Institutions
like OPEC will become mired in frustration when they are unable to bontrol
markets as they had done in earlier years. This process of degeneration has
taken place in the last year or two.3 9 It could have begun even sooner if the
American government had just kept its hand out of the energy business.
The point of this essay is not to elaborate, however, what I think to be
the appropriate choices that I as a policy analyst should choose to make. It
is, instead, to identify the appropriate normative boundaries to the set of permissible choices. When, therefore, I criticize both American and Canadian
forms of price control over crude oil, I do not do it solely on the ground that
I think them inefficient. I do so also on the ground that the system of controls
depends for its very survival on the government confiscating large sources of
private wealth without compensation. The great battles over state, provincial
or federal regulation--of which Commonwealth Edison is but one-are only
debates over which level of government should be allowed to confiscate the
most from private hands. If a government-Canadian, American, state, provincial, federal-wants to get into the business of regulating the price of oil
and gas alone, it can do so by simply buying at market prices as much oil and
gas as it chooses to, paying for supplies purchased out of the general revenue
funds. If thereafter it chooses to sell the oil and gas at below-market prices
on some type of rationed basis, it has not offended the normative principles
against confiscation even if it has engaged in a policy which is for a variety
of economic reasons wholly self-destructive. Placing this burden of purchase
upon the government would make clear the real costs of its programmes at a
very early stage, such that the likelihood that the policy would continue
z9 Since the Conference at which this article was presented, there have been major
cuts in both prices and outputs in the spring of 1982, further confirming the general
position taken here.
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becomes remote in the extreme. Yet even this prediction should not be confused with the normative judgment. If it is thought that some symbolic,
political or national concern justifies this general loss of both liberty and
wealth, then the state can pursue this to the bitter end, so long as it does not
resort to selective pressures against one group of individuals.
There is of course another alternative to price controls over crude oil.
The government could simply confiscate outright some portion of the oil in
place and then dispose of it as it sees fit. Here there is an issue of equity
in theft, for the outright confiscation could be of the total ownership interests
of some, or it could be spread pro rata over the ownership interests of all.
The difference in incidence simply determines who is entitled to protest the
takings involved, for even a widespread confiscation of oil, without reciprocal
benefits to the owners, can in no way convert confiscation into a legitimate
form of government action. Notwithstanding the strong moral case against
this form of action, there is something to be said on its behalf, not in comparison to the proper system of purchase, but in comparison to the confiscation occurring under the applicable price regulations. Quite simply, straight
confiscation interferes far less with the operation of markets than does the
alternative system of price regulation. The government takes its oil interests
and exploits them to maximize the wealth of the whole, confining its distributional decisions to matters with little or no effect upon the productive side
of the enterprise. The government simply becomes an owner or partner in
certain oil interests. The only reason that this is not done is because the overt
nature of the confiscation makes it impossible to conceal its illicit nature
behind a fog of words. Governments always prefer the hidden taxes that
should be condemned for sound institutional reasons. The indirect forms of
confiscation are therefore preferred even though they are less efficient because
they make plausible a government denial of the truth which has great symbolic value for most of us, who do not want to face the hard moral questions
raised by its conduct. The system thus runs by an internal, if destructive,
logic that no intellectual clarification can displace.
A parallel analysis is appropriate for another recent form of Canadian
regulation, which unlike price controls over crude oil, is not found in the
United States. I refer to the elaborate system of review which is established

under the ForeignInvestment Review Act (FIRA). 40 In essence, the statutory

plan is designed to tolerate further foreign investment into Canada in whatever form only if an administrative board determines that the proposed investment will provide, all things considered, some "significant benefit to
41 The tests which
Canada ....
,,
are used to determine this particular result
cannot be purely economic. If they were, there would have to be a well-nigh
conclusive presumption against a system which in turn will reduce the levels
of employment and economic activity within the country. To be sure, a
scheme with this far reaching impact must confer a net benefit upon a few
individuals, but these will be quasi-monopolists who, protected from foreign
40,S.C. 1973-74,
41Id., s. 2(1).

c. 46 as am. by S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 128.
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competition, will be able to market inferior goods and services at higher
prices. No one can question the power of any nation to take strong steps
whenever there is a substantial threat to its own national welfare and safety.
But it is quite premature to assume that foreign investment in productive
activities ever presents that sort of immediate threat. In almost every conceivable case, all important interests of national security can be effectively
protected by a more tailored set of restrictions.
The question still remains, however, whether there can be any principled
challenge to the FIRA on moral grounds. As regards future investment of
foreign capital, these seem to be minor. The disadvantage wrought by the
statute is advertised in advance, so that foreigners can steer clear of even
approved investments if they think that the supplemental investments, necessary to the success of their overall plans, will be blocked by Canadian administrative actions. Canadians will share in whatever political or symbolic
benefits are generated by the actions in more or less equal proportions.
Without the direct measure of gains and losses, the non-discriminatory effects
of the statute save it from a powerful moral attack.
There is, however, one class of claimants who have a more powerful
case against application of the statute on normative grounds: the individual
foreign firms which have already made investments prior to the passage of
the statute. The issue was raised as a matter of statutory construction in
Dow Jones & Co. v. Attorney-General of Canada,42 where the Court had to
decide whether the statute applied to the transfer of a Canadian subsidiary
from one non-Canadian company to another. Dow Jones, an American corporation, in a complicated set of transactions designed to obtain favourable
tax treatment under American law, acquired Irwin U.S., an American corporation, and its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary, Irwin Dorsey. It was
agreed on all sides that the statute in question did not reach Dow Jones'
acquisition of Irwin U.S. as such, but only the acquisition of its Canadian
subsidiary, Irwin Dorsey. The Court held that the transaction was nonetheless
caught by the notice and reporting provisions of the statute. The Court was
obviously concerned about charges of retroactive application of the statute,
which it thought unfounded:
There can be no doubt that the Act is not retroactive in that it does not affect
acquisitions of control of Canadian business enterprises which had been fully
accomplished by non-eligible persons before the Act came into force unless and
until that business is resold to another non-eligible person. 43

It then answered the possible charge of discrimination under the statute as
follows:
No distinction is made in the Act between an acquisition by such [non-eligible]
persons of a Canadian-owned business and an acquisition from one who is a
non-eligible person but who obtained such control before the Act was in force
or from a non-eligible person who obtained the required consent after the Act
came into force.
42
43
44

(1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 395, 11 B.L.R. 18 (F.C.T.D.).

Id. at 400.
Id.
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As a matter of principle, however, these observations, although true, do
not meet the challenge. With respect to investments already made, the rules
of the game have been changed in mid-play in ways that necessarily decrease
the value of foreign holding of Canadian property. Whereas once there was
a robust market for the shares of the foreign corporations, today that market
is effectively limited to Canadian purchasers. It is true that Canadians are
subject to the same restriction when they seek to sell to foreigners, but the
Canadian companies, in addition to symbolic benefits, continue to enjoy two
rights that the statute systematically denies to foreign corporations: a Canadian company can always make fresh infusions of capital, and it can acquire
the Canadian subsidiary of a foreign corporation without approval. It therefore has both special rights and special duties; the foreign corporation only
has special duties. The entire position can, moreover, become more distressing
if there is any concerted pressure on the part of Canadian or provincial
government officials to induce the foreign shareholders of the Canadian companies to sell their shares at distress prices, as by other forms of tax or
regulation.
Looking therefore at the FIRA as a whole, its review procedures function as a powerful instrument to force the shift of existing investment from
foreign to Canadian hands at below-market prices. While the general depressing effects of this legislation on the Canadian economy may be only cause
for lamentation, its application to existing foreign investment is but another
form of confiscation.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to draw attention to the question
of which forms of government control should be regarded as within the
domain of permissible policy choices, and which should be regarded as disguised confiscations. In dealing with this theme, it is quite clear that while
all forms of regulation and taxation are subtle forms of the taking of private
property, they are not necessarily confiscatory in and of themselves. Instead
they are subject to two forms of justification: the police power and implicit
in-kind compensation. There is within the American framework some faint
recognition that the problem can be analyzed in this particular fashion, which
is however followed by the implicit conclusion that with taxes and economic
regulations the broad terrain of the prima facie case is fully occupied by its
two principled exceptions. The point of this article is to show that in the
context of recent retroactive and special legislation there are instances in
which the prima facie case is not blunted by these two exceptions, even when
broadly construed. The propositions in question are illustrated by consciously
taking easy cases in which state conduct should in principle be attacked
as illegitimate (in the Canadian context) or as illegitimate and unconstitutional (in the American context). As an historical matter, government legislation of this form has been with us for a long time. The greater stakes of
modem regulation give the issue a new urgency, but do not require any
change in either the analysis or outcome. Unchecked confiscation, total or
partial, is always inconsistent with the ideal of limited government.

